Section 106 of CERCLA: An Alternative to Superfund Liability by Clark, Neil
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 2 Article 6
1-1-1985
Section 106 of CERCLA: An Alternative to
Superfund Liability
Neil Clark
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neil Clark, Section 106 of CERCLA: An Alternative to Superfund Liability , 12 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.
381 (1985), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol12/iss2/6




In the early 1970's, residents of Woburn, Massachusetts discov-
ered that several cases of childhood leukemia had occurred in 
their neighborhood, in an area of only a few blocks. 1 During the 
period from 1969 to 1970, twelve children were diagnosed as leu-
kemia cases-nine of these have died.:! A subsequent study by the 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineer-
ing (DEQE) revealed that the groundwater supply that provided 
drinking water for the area was contaminated with industrial 
solvents suspected of being carcinogenic.3 Although a causal link-
age has yet to be legally established between the contamination 
and the unusually high incidence of childhood leukemia, it is clear 
that years of improper hazardous waste4 disposal such as the 
burying of barrels in shallow landfills and the pouring of chemi-
cals into open pools5 has left its legacy in Woburn. The contami-
nated area includes sixty acres of once-wooded and now barren 
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Ripstein, Chemical Waste Beneath a Massachusetts Town, 41 Bus. & SOC'y REV. 46 
(1982). 
2 Id. at 47. 
3Id. 
4 It is often difficult to distinguish hazardous waste from non-hazardous waste, be-
cause most wastes can be dangerous under the right circumstances. Thus, there is no 
commonly recognized definition of a "hazardous waste." However, the federal statutes 
governing hazardous wastes have defined what a hazardous waste is for the purpose of 
those acts. For example, under regulations issued pursuant to the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA), a hazardous waste is defined as any waste which is 
either determined specifically by EPA to be hazardous or one that is ignitable, corrosive, 
reactive, or toxic. 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-261.24 (1984). See generally QUARLES, FEDERAL 
REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTES; A GUIDE TO RCRA 50-80 (1982). 
5 Ripstein, supra note 1, at 46. 
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land and another three hundred acres that is suspected of being 
contaminated.6 
The plight of the people of Woburn is representative of a much 
broader problem in the United States. The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) currently believes that as many as 50,000 
waste disposal sites may presently contain hazardous wastes.7 
EPA also believes that at least two thousand of these sites con-
tain enough hazardous waste to present imminent threats to 
human health.8 The agency estimates that each site will require 
an average of $R6 million to clean Up,9 creating a total cost of at 
least $7.2 billion. These costs can only increase, because it has 
been documented that the amount of hazardous waste produced 
annually in the United States is increasing at a rate of 3.5 percent 
each year. 1O The extent of the problem is impossible to estimate 
precisely, and could be much greater than EPA currently be-
lieves. 11 
Hazardous waste sites commonly threaten public drinking wa-
ter, and thus human health, by contaminating groundwater 
supplies. I~ This threat is particularly severe because almost half 
of the public depends on groundwater supplies for drinking wa-
ter,13 and seventy-five percent of landfills are in areas where they 
could affect groundwater supplies. 14 
In response to this threat, Congress enacted two statutes spe-
cifically addressing the problem of hazardous waste disposal. In 
1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA).15 That statute empowered EPA to create a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme to control the methods of hazard-
ous waste disposal. 16 What RCRA lacked, however, were provi-
sions which would have granted EPA the authority to clean up 
currently dangerous sites where waste was disposed of in the 
past. 17 This legislative inadequacy was particularly acute, because 
6Id. 
7 Weiland, Enforcement Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,8 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641 (1980). 
B S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). 
9 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). 
10 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980). 
11 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980). 
12 QUARLES, supra note 4, at 25. 
13 Id. at 30. 
14 S. EpSTEIN, C. POPE & L. BROWN, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 8 (1982). 
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. V 1981). 
16 Weiland, supra note 7, at 642. 
17 According to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Report, 
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site owners and waste transporters connected with past dumping 
often became insolvent before the site was a known danger. 18 
Congress soon recognized that except as a prospective regulatory 
statute, RCRA was inadequate and that another weapon was 
needed in the battle against unsafe disposal sites. 19 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).~o The 
major purpose of the Act was to fill in the gaps left by RCRA by 
"providing a mechanism for rapid response, including an immedi-
ately available source of funding for cleanup when hazardous 
substances are released into the environment."~1 The act estab-
lishes a "Superfund" which is available for government use in 
cleaning up a disposal site.~~ After expending Superfund money, 
the government may then sue to recoup its costs from certain 
parties specified in Section 107. ~3 
Section 106 of CERCLA~4 represents a separate, though less 
clear path toward the abatement of hazards at disposal sites. This 
section authorizes suits for equitable relief by the government to 
abate hazards at waste sites, but does not specify who may be 
liable or under what standard such liability should be deter-
mined. ~~ The government has attempted to utilize this general 
provision to force producers of hazardous waste-referred to as 
"generators" -to clean up sites utilized for disposal in the pasUfi 
The failure of section 106 to specify responsible parties and a 
standard of liability has allowed potential defendants to challenge 
the government's use of section 106 as an alternative route to 
liability. It is the enforcement of section 106 that has troubled 
courts and is the subject of this article. Before section 106 may be 
invoked, various threshold requirements must be met with re-
spect to the nature of the hazard to be eliminated. Specifically, 
section 7003 of RCRA allows such suits, but the "uncharted legal pathway will be 
lengthy and uncertain." S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980). For a discussion of 
section 7003 see infra note 73. 
18 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980). 
'9 Id. at 11. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
" S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. v 1981). 
"3 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. v 1981). For a discussion of the Superfund process see infra 
text and notes at notes 76-86. 
"' 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
"' Id. 
"" See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Co., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 
1982). 
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there must be an imminent and substantial endangerment to 
health or environment due to the release or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance from a facility. ~7 Secondly, there is some 
question as to whether section 106 may be used to remedy the 
effects of past disposal practices or whether it can be used merely 
to enjoin current unsafe practices. Third, section 106 does not 
specify which parties are proper defendants in actions brought 
thereunder. Fourth, assuming the section reaches a particular 
defendant, there exists an issue as to what standard of liability 
should be applied to measure its actions. Finally, with respect to 
the selection of proper defendants and the standard of liability, it 
is unclear whether section 106 itself furnishes the necessary in-
formation, or whether that section merely authorizes suit and 
these substantive questions are to be determined by looking out-
side section 106: elsewhere in CERCLA or within the common 
law. 
Before reaching an analysis of these substantive issues, this 
article will present an overview of the hazardous waste problem. 
Section II of this article will discuss groundwater and the pro-
cesses by which it is contaminated by infiltration of hazardous 
wastes. Section III will then discuss the general operation of 
RCRA and CERCLA. The analysis will explain why the govern-
ment has relied so heavily on section 106 as an enforcement 
mechanism. Section IV will then discuss the threshold require-
ments that must exist before section 106 may be invoked, and 
whether that section applies to the past actions of generators of 
hazardous wastes. Finally, assuming that section 106 applies to 
such parties, section V will discuss the nature and source of 
liability under section 106. The article will arrive at two conclu-
sions. First, section 106 authorizes the government to obtain 
equitable relief forcing generators of hazardous waste to abate 
hazardous conditions at sites where their waste was disposed of in 
the past. Second, generators are strictly liable for such relief. 
II. THE PROCESS AND PROBLEMS OF GROUNDWATER 
CONTAMINATION BY HAZARDOUS WASTES 
Many industrial processes produce hazardous waste as a by-
product.~~ For example, gold refineries produce cyanide wastes,:!9 
" 42 u.s.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
" EpSTEIN, supra note 14, at 9. 
'" Id. at 6. 
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while other industries produce such hazardous by-products as 
lead, chromium, and arsenic.:.l Among the most dangerous 
hazardous substances are PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), a 
carcinogenic insulating fluid which has resulted in health 
emergencies at many waste sites.31 If these wastes are disposed of 
in secure landfills, where wastes are segregated and sealed se-
curely, they present little danger.32 However, according to EPA 
only a "negligible" portion of hazardous wastes are disposed of in 
this manner.33 Most wastes are improperly disposed of in non-
secure landfills and surface impoundments, or by various "mid-
night" dumping techniques where waste is disposed of illegally 
wherever an open area can be found.34 Waste not properly dis-
posed of often leaks into the groundwater supply and presents a 
serious threat to human health.35 This problem is compounded by 
the fact that groundwater is a common source of drinking water 
throughout the United States36 and because the nature of 
groundwater makes it difficult to cure any contamination.37 This 
section will discuss the problems that can result from improper 
disposal techniques and the infiltration of hazardous wastes into 
a groundwater supply. 
Groundwater is water that collects in the pore spaces among 
particles of clay, silt, sand and gravel below the surface of the 
ground.38 This area called the zone of saturation,39 contains water 
which is drawn from the surface either by conventional wells or 
by more sophisticated mechanical pumping devices.40 Providing 
approximately 31 trillion gallons of water each year, groundwater 
accounts for forty-eight percent of the public drinking water sup-
plyY 
Hazardous waste enters groundwater supplies by leaking from 
dumpsites located either above or below ground.42 These sites take 
30 Ripstein, supra note 1, at 46. 
31 S. REP. NO. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) . 
.. , QUARLES, supra note 4, at 26. 
33 Id. 
34 I d. at 25-28. 
35 Id. at 25. 
36 Id. at 30. 
37 Id. at 34. 
38 2 V. Y ANNECONE, JR. & B. COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 451 
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Y ANNECONE & COHEN]. 
39 I d. at 452. 
40 Y ANNECONE & COHEN, supra note 37, at 452. 
41 QUARLES, supra note 4, at 30. 
42 QUARLES, supra note 4, at 25. 
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a variety of forms. Wastes may be deposited in secure landfills,43 
where the chemicals are segregated into separate compartments, 
which are well sealed to prevent leakage,44 and continuously mon-
itored by EPA.45 Unfortunately, as noted above, these sites ac-
count for a very small percentage of the disposal of hazardous 
waste in the United States.46 
When landfills are not secured, a variety of problems can occur. 
First, because wastes are often disposed of in receptacles (com-
monly barrels) which decay, the wastes escape and leach into the 
groundwater supplyY Further, because the wastes are not segre-
gated in non-secure landfills, they can intermingle, cause explo-
sions and fires, and further destroy their receptacles.4l' By seg-
regating the wastes and providing an impermeable liner as is 
done in secure landfills, these problems would be prevented.49 
Another common disposal method is containment in surface 
impoundments, which are man-made depressions or diked-in 
areas that hold wastes not contained in barrels.50 Forty-eight 
percent of hazardous wastes are disposed of in surface impound-
ments.51 The most serious problem with this method of disposal is 
leakage of liquid wastes into the groundwater supply.52 Preventa-
tive measures, such as providing an impermeable liner or locating 
the waste away from groundwater supplies,53 could alleviate the 
health problems associated with this method. 
Where disposal techniques are inadequate and a contaminant 
becomes mixed with the groundwater, it normally spreads in a 
plume-like shape, flowing in the direction of the flow of groundwa-
ter and fanning out to the sides.54 The contaminated water flows 
slowly, at the rate of only ten to one hundred feet per year/',s 
Once groundwater becomes contaminated with hazardous 
waste, it is extremely difficult to detoxify. First, because ground-







50 [d. at 24. 
51 [d. at 25. 
" [d. at 26. 
53 [d. at 25. 
54 [d. at 30. 
55 [d. 
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water moves so slowly, once it is contaminated it will remain 
impure for a long period of time.56 Secondly, because a contami-
nant generally moves in a plume-like shape, it is often necessary to 
drill numerous test wells to measure the quality of the water in a 
particular area. 57 As a result, testing for groundwater contamina-
tion is expensive. 58 Furthermore, once testing is completed, meth-
ods of abatement are burdensome, but can be accomplished in 
various ways. A contaminant may be removed from the ground 
by excavating an area and disposing of the materials properly. 59 
The flow of a contaminant may also be halted by inserting im-
permeable shields at the boundaries of the contaminated site.60 As 
a third alternative, the water may be pumped out, purified and 
returned to the ground.61 
All of these techniques, however, are very expensive, which 
hampers governmental and private action. For example, in the 
Woburn emergency,62 one million dollars was spent on prelimi-
nary testing before any cleanup even began.63 Another site in 
Elizabeth, New Jersey required 26 million dollars and 250,000 
man hours to clean Up.64 RCRA and CERCLA are the latest 
congressional attempts to deal with this problem. This article will 
now turn to a general discussion of these statutes and then to the 
issues arising under section 106 of CERCLA. 
III. RCRA AND THE SUPERFUND RESPONSE AUTHORITY: THE 
NEED FOR SECTION 106 AS AN ALTERNATE METHOD OF HAZARD 
ABATEMENT 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 
called for a comprehensive regulatory scheme to manage the 
treatment, handling and disposal of hazardous waste.65 RCRA 
provided for the proper handling of hazardous waste currently 
56 Id. at 31. The duration of the contamination also dep~nds on the life of the contam-
inant itself. EPSTEIN, tmpra note 14, at 30. 
57 QUARLES, supra note 4, at 31. 
56 Id. 
59Id. at 34. 
00 Id. 
6! Id. 
62 See supra text and notes at notes 1-6. 
63 Ripstein, tmpra note 1, at 47. 
64 Graziano, Hazardous Waste Site Cleanup in Elizabeth, New Jersey, in HAZARDOUS 
WASTE MANAGEMENT FOR THE 80's 278 (1982). 
65 QUARLES, supra note 4, at 2. 
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being disposed of,66 but failed to deal explicitly with past disposal 
activities or their effects. Thus, it merely regulates prospec-
tively.67 For example, any hazardous waste68 is subject to a "cradle 
to grave" manifest system so that the waste can be traced from its 
origin to its ultimate disposition.69 Any disposal facility storing 
hazardous waste must obtain a permit dictating compliance with 
all applicable regulations.70 Section 3008 of RCRA established an 
enforcement mechanism under which orders may be issued to 
force compliance with permit requirements. 71 Failure to comply 
with such orders may result in a fine of up to $25,000 per day, or 
the revocation of a permit.72 Section 3008 also includes criminal 
penalties for conscious non-compliance with permit require-
ments.73 Finally, Section 7003 authorizes suit to "immediately 
restrain" any person "contributing to" an "imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to health or the environment" at a 
hazardous waste disposal site.74 
Thus, RCRA and its accompanying regulations established a 
comprehensive program for managing current disposal prac-
66 Id. at 3. 
67 Id. 
68 For the RCRA definition of "hazardous waste" see 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (Supp. v 1981); 
40 C.F.R. § 261.20-261.24 (1981). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (Supp. V. 1981). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (Supp. V. 1981). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (Supp. V. 1981). 
72 QUARLES, supra note 4, at 10. 
73 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4) (Supp. V 1981). 
74 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. V 1981). This section provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence 
that the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid 
waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on 
behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court to immediately 
restrain any person contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, trans-
portation or disposal to stop such handling, storage, treatment, transportation, 
or disposal or to take such other action as may be necessary. The Administrator 
shall provide notice to the affected State of any such suit. The Administrator 
may also, after notice to the affected State, take other action under this section 
including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect 
public health and the environment. 
The government has sought to use section 7003 as they have sought to use section 106 
of CERCLA. See supra text and notes at notes 23-27. The validity of the use of section 
7003 in this manner, however, is beyond the scope of this article. For an excellent 
discussion of the issues under section 7003, see ReRA's Imminent Hazard Provision and 
Inactive Waste Dumps: A Reappraisal after U.S. v. Waste Industries, 13 ENVTL L. REP. 
10074. See also United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1982). But 
see United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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tices. 75 This regulatory scheme, however, does not address the 
crucial need to remedy presently dangerous conditions at sites 
where waste had been disposed of in the past.76 In response to this 
legislative inadequacy, Congress enacted CERCLA at the close of 
its session in 1980.77 The Act creates a "Superfund"7S which is 
available for immediate use to clean up a dangerous hazardous 
waste site.79 When there is a release or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance80 or any contaminant which may cause an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or 
welfare,Bl the President is authorized, under section 111 of 
CERCLA, to expend a portion of the Superfund to finance reme-
dial action.ll~ The Fund, by combining federal and industry funds 
specified in detail in section 131(b)(I)(A-E),B3 amounts to 1.6 billion 
dollars over a five year period.1l4 
Under section 107 of CERCLA, generators and transporters of 
hazardous wastes, as well as waste site owners, are liable to the 
United States for the costs of remedial action.1l5 Such liability is 
subject only to the specified defenses of an act of God, an act of 
war, and certain acts or omissions of third parties not in a con-
tractual or agency relationship with the defendant.1l6 
Through this statutory mechanism, Congress hoped to address 
the problem of improper past disposal practices by providing a 
rotating fund available for immediate use to abate hazardous 
conditions at a disposal site.H7 Congress also intended that those 
responsible for the damage would ultimately bear the cost of 
cleanup pursuant to section 107.8H In practice, however, the Super-
fund process has failed to address adequately the problems pre-
sented by improper past disposal practices. One weakness has 
been the lack of proper funding. The $44 million annual allocation 
75 QUARLES, supra note 4, at 3. 
76 Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. at 1314. But see Price, 688 F.2d at 213-14. 
77 United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982). 
7H 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. V 1981). 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9611 (Supp. V 1981). 
HO For the definition of hazardous substances under CERCLA, see infra text and notes 
at notes 99-108. 
H' 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (Supp. V 1981). 
"" 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
"3 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(1)(A)-(E) (Supp. V 1981). 
H4 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). 
H5 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4) (Supp. V 1981). 
"6 Id. at § 9607(b)(1-3). 
H7 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980). 
H" Id. 
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has forced EPA to establish a list of a few hundred priority sites.89 
These priority sites represent only a small percentage of the two 
thousand sites EPA believes to be currently dangerous to human 
health.90 A second weakness is the manner in which the fund 
operates. The Superfund mechanism requires that the govern-
ment expend all of the money necessary to clean up a site and 
then institute a suit for reimbursement.91 If the government can-
not locate a solvent responsible party, or is forced to settle with a 
defendant it can find, a deficit in the supposedly self-maintaining 
Superfund will appear. 
The inadequacies of both RCRA and the Superfund process of 
CERCLA have prompted the government to utilize section 106 of 
CERCLA as an alternate method of addressing the hazards 
brought about by improper past disposals. Section 106(a) states, in 
pertinent part: 
[W]hen the president determines that there may be an im-
minent and substantial endangerment to the public health or 
welfare or the environment because of an actual or threat-
ened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may 
require the Attorney General of the United States to secure 
such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or 
threat, and the district court of the United States in the 
district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdidion to 
grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the 
case may require. The President may also ... [issue] such 
orders as may be necessary to protect public health and 
welfare and the environment.9~ 
It is argued by the government that this section allows it to seek a 
judicial order forcing generators of hazardous wastes to abate the 
hazard apart from any use of the Superfund. The language of 
section 106, however, fails to specify proper defendants and the 
standard of liability under which their actions should be judged. 
This ambiguity has invited waste generators to challenge the 
government's construction of section 106. These generators have 
argued that section 106 can only be used to halt current improper 
disposal practices and thus that the only proper defendants are 
those who could be enjoined from continuing such practices.93 
H9 The National Priorities List, 48 Fed. Reg. 40658 (Sept. 8, 1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 37083 
(Sept. 21, 1984). 
90 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). 
91 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (Supp. V 1981). 
9' 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. V 1981). 
93 See e.g., United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Penn. 1982). 
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The language of section 106 does not explicitly support either 
interpretation. Moreover, the legislative history of section 106 is 
not dispositive.94 The following section will examine the validity of 
the government's interpretation of section 106, and discuss the 
role that section 106 assumes in the cleanup of sites where im-
proper past disposal actions have led to ongoing hazardous situa-
tions. 
IV. THE ApPLICABILITY OF SECTION 106 TO THE PAST ACTIONS 
OF GENERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 
It is widely disputed whether section 106 permits the govern-
ment to force generators to bear the burden of current hazard 
abatement at sites where such generators' waste was disposed of 
in the past. The broad language of section 106 has allowed several 
issues to arise regarding such a use of section 106. First, section 
106 provides that the government may seek judicial relief when 
there "may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the 
public health or environment" due to an "actual or threatened 
release" of a "hazardous substance" from a "facility."95 The defini-
tions of each of these threshold requirements will be crucial to 
any conclusion about the use of section 106 in any particular case. 
Secondly, although it is clear that section 106 may be used to 
enjoin current improper disposal practices,96 it is not clear 
whether that section may be invoked to address a current danger 
which has resulted from the past actions of a defendant. The third 
issue that has arisen is whether generators are proper defen-
dants at all. Section 106 does not explicitly assign liability to any 
one party. Finally, section 106 fails to state, in explicit terms, a 
standard of liability. As a result, it is unclear whether defendants 
are to be held to a strict liability standard, or some other standard 
such as one of negligence.97 
This section will first discuss each of the four threshold re-
quirements that must be met before section 106 may be properly 
invoked. The article will then discuss whether section 106 may be 
94 But see United States v. Price (Price III), 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1112 n.9 (D.N.J. 1983). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. V 1981). 
96 Indeed, if the section does not allow an injunction against present action, the section 
means nothing at all. Moreover, even cases contruing section 106 restrictively recognize 
that section 106 may be used to enjoin current practices. See e.g., Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 
799. 
97 See infra notes 258, 259. 
392 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:381 
used to address the dangers resulting from the past actions of 
generators. 
A. Definitional Issues Under Section 106 
For section 106 to be invoked, there must be an "actual or 
threatened release" of a "hazardous substance" from a "facility" 
that may be presenting an "imminent and substantial endan-
germent" to the public health or environment. YH Because in any 
given case, the definitions of these terms may be crucial, each 
statutory phrase will be reviewed. 
1. Hazardous Substances 
Section 106 permits the Attorney General to seek relief for 
environmental or health dangers only when such dangers result 
from an actual or threatened release of a "hazardous sub-
stance."w Congress has defined this term in section 101(43) of 
CERCLA as materials falling into one of two categories. loo The 
first category includes substances defined as hazardous by Con-
gress and EPA and listed under the Clean Air Act,IOI the Clean 
Water Act, 1O~ the Toxic Substances Control Act 103 or the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).104 The second category 
includes substances that possess the hazardous characteristics 
identified in the regulations issued pursuant to RCRA. J()~ The 
regulations list these characteristics as ignitability, corrosivity, 
reactivity and toxicity,l06 and prescribe tests for determining 
when a substance possesses one of these four characteristics. 107 
The definition of "hazardous substances" in CERCLA is, there-
fore, quite broad, encompassing all of the substances regulated by 
the aforementioned environmental statutes combined. lOH 
!J8 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. V 1981). 
"" Id. 
100 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp. V 1981). 
101 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981). 
10' 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(2)(A), 1317(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
103 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1982). 
104 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (Supp. V 1981). 
10.' 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1981). 
100 QUARLES, supra note 4, at 53. 
107 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-261.24 (1981). 
lOS For an extensive discussion and a complete list of hazardous substances under 
RCRA, see QUARLES, supra note 4, at 50-80. 
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2. Actual or Threatened Release 
Section 106 also requires that there be an "actual or threatened 
release" of a hazardous substance from a facility before it may be 
invoked. I09 A release is defined in section 101(22) as any "spilling, 
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, in-
jecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the envi-
ronment .... "110 An actual release need not occur for section 106 to 
be invoked; that section requires only that there be an actual or 
threatened release of a hazardous substance. 
3. Facility 
Section 106 requires that the actual or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance occur from a "facility." This term is defined 
in section 101(9) of CERCLA as " ... any building, structure, in-
stallation ... well, pit, ... impoundment, ditch, landfill ... or any 
site ... where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, 
disposed of, or placed or otherwise come to be located .... "111 Thus, 
an actual or threatened release from a site where waste has been 
disposed of in the past is sufficient to trigger the application of 
section 106. The past tense construction of the second part of this 
definition is consistent with the general purpose of CERCLA to 
address dangers resulting from past disposal practices. 112 
4. Imminent and Substantial Endangerment 
The final requirement for application of section 106 is that there 
" ... may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the 
public health or welfare or the environment."113 Although the 
meaning of this phrase is seemingly well settled, 114 it is not defined 
in CERCLA; consequently, in many cases brought under section 
106, as well as other environmental statutes containing the 
phrase, defendants have asserted that conditions did not amount 
109 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
110 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (Supp. v 1981). 
Ill. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (Supp. v 1981). 
I" See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980). 
113 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
114 See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane). Ethyl 
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Note, 
The Emergency Powers in the Environmental Protection Statutes: A Suggestion for a 
Unified Emergency Provision, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 298, 312-15 (1979); Weiland, supra 
note 7, at 646-49; Duke, Using RCRA's Imminent Hazard Provision in Hazardous Waste 
Emergencies, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 599, 605-08 (1981). 
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to an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public 
health or environment. 115 The controversy generated by this am-
biguity makes the phrase the most important threshold defini-
tional requirement to be met before section 106 may be invoked. 
First, "endangerment" requires "only proof of risk of harm, not 
actual harm." 116 In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,117 the Circuit Court for the 
District of Columbia states that the endangerment standard is 
precautionary in nature, and therefore does not require proof of 
actual harm. 118 
The terms of section 106 further require that this risk of harm 
be "imminent" and "substantial."119 The term "imminent" mod-
ifies the risk of harm only; the harm itself need not be imminent, 
only the risk of that harm.120 Thus, if a carcinogen is discharged, 
the risk of harm is present even though the harm itself-the 
cancer-may not surface for years. 
The term "substantial" appears to modify both "risk" and 
"harm."121 In interpreting the phrase "imminent and substantial 
endangerment" in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDW A), 122 two 
courts utilized a flexible approach to this requirement by consid-
ering the degree of risk and harm. 123 Under this test, the degree of 
risk necessary to satisfy the definitional requirement would de-
crease as the degree of harm threatened at a given site increased. 
Conversely, as the degree of potential harm decreased, the degree 
of risk required to satisfy the requirement would increase. 124 
Under this approach, however, the risk must not be "completely 
speculative" nor the harm "de minimis" in degree. 125 In short, for 
there to be an "imminent and substantial endangerment," the 
115 See e.g., Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1109-10. 
116 Emergency Powers, supra note 114, at 312. 
117 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 17. The case included the interpretation of the word 
"endanger" as it appeared in the Clean Air Act. Ethyl Corp. had sought review of an 
EPA order restricting lead content in gasoline. Id. at 1. 
118Id. 
119 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. v 1981). 
120 Emergency Powers, supra note 114, at 313 nn. 314, 315. 
121 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 18. 
122 42 U.S.C. § 300i (1976). This provision is the "imminent hazard" provision of the 
SDWA, which resembles section 7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. v 1981), and 
section 106 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. V 1981). 
123 Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 519-20 (8th Cir. 1975). Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d 
at 18. 
124 Emergency Powers, supra note 114, at 314-15. 
125 Id. at 315 (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1974 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6454, 6488). 
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risk of harm must be imminent, and either the risk or the harm 
must be substantial. 
Satisfaction of these definitional requirements is a prerequisite 
to the application of section 106 in any particular case. Even if 
these threshold tests are satisfied, however, there still remain 
substantial questions as to the scope of section 106 liability. In the 
following subsections, this article will discuss whether section 106 
may be used to force generators to clean up the effects of past 
disposal of hazardous waste. 
B. Applicabil'tty of Section 106 to the Past Actions of Generators 
As discussed earlier, the major purpose of CERCLA was to 
provide a method to abate the problem of current dangers caused 
by past disposal practices. 126 Prior to CERCLA's enactment, Con-
gress recognized the difficulty of locating a solvent, responsible 
party to bear the cost of cleanup. 127 In response to these concerns, 
Congress drafted section 107 of CERCLA to impose liability upon, 
among others, generators for the costs of cleanup resulting from 
past disposal. 128 
As the inadequacies of the Superfund mechanism surfaced, the 
need for section 106 as an alternative source of liability became 
apparent. 129 Similar to a section 107 action, concerns over the 
problems of past disposal and insolvent defendants are relevant 
to liability under section 106. Consequently, the government has 
attempted to use section 106 to impose liability on generators for 
abatement of hazards at sites where their waste was disposed of 
in the past. l30 Such generators may be referred to as "past 
generators." 131 The following subsections will discuss the applica-
bility of section 106 to these entities. 
'"6 See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980). 
mId. 
'"" 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. v 1981). 
'"9 See supra text and notes at notes 86-93. 
"., See e.g., Reilly, 546 F. Supp. 1100. 
'3' In United States v. Wade, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania used the term "past generator" to describe the defendant before it. This is a useful 
shorthand term to describe a generator of hazardous waste, who is being sued because 
waste it generated in the past was disposed of, also in the past, at a site that is currently 
presenting the requisite statutory endangerment. However, in analyzing the applicabil-
ity of section 106 to "past generators" it is important to separate this shorthand into its 
component parts and discuss each separately. Thus, the first point to be discussed is 
whether section 106 applies, in general, to current dangers resulting from past actions, 
i.e., the generation and disposal of wastes in the past. If it does, then any party that is a 
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1. Application of Section 106 to Past Generators: An Objective 
Examination of Relevant Caselaw. 
In United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical/32 the United States 
brought suit under section 106 against a hazardous waste 
generator for abatemenV33 of groundwater pollution near the 
Reilly dumpsite. l34 The defendant, as owner and operator of the 
site, had deposited its waste there for fifty-five years until it sold 
the site in 1973, years before the government's suit was 
brought.l35 In denying Reilly's motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that section 106 does not apply to generators,136 the court held 
that a past generator was liable for relief even though the site 
was no longer operating and it was no longer the owner.137 The 
court found the language of section 106 to contain no limitations 
on the classes of persons that could be proper defendants. l38 The 
court further stated that the statute should be broadly construed 
to give effect to Congress' intent to empower the federal govern-
ment to respond effectively to the serious national problems 
resulting from hazardous waste disposal, noting that the 
judiciary should not "frustrate the government's ability to re-
spond." 139 
In United States v. Price,14O the government attempted to force a 
defendant to implement cleanup at a site it did not own but where 
its waste had been disposed Of.141 In refusing to grant the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss the government's claim under section 
proper defendant (including not only generators, but also site owners, transporters and 
other handlers of waste) may be held liable for abatement of present dangers resulting 
from its past actions. The second component of "past generator" must then be discussed, 
the issue being whether section 106 applies to generators of hazardous waste. It is 
important to emphasize that where the defendant is a generator who is being sued with 
respect to his past actions, that defendant may extricate itself by convincing a court 
either that section 106 does not apply to the broad category of past actions or the more 
narrow category of generators. That is, for section 106 to be applicable to "past 
generators" it must be applicable to both past actions and generators . 
• 32 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) . 
• 33 The Reilly opinion does not indicate exactly what type of relief the plaintiff was 
requesting. Because the decision was merely a refusal of the defendant's motion to 
dismiss, the court never reached the issue of relief . 
• 34 Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1105 . 
• 3" ld . 
• 36 I d. at 1120 . 
• 37 ld . 
• 36 ld . 
• 39 ld . 
• 40 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983). 
141 ld. at 1107. 
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106, the Price court held that past generators were liable under 
section 106 for a variety of reasons. 14~ First, the court stated that 
the language of section 7003 of RCRA was inadequate to impose 
such liability on past generators, and that Congress drafted sec-
tion 106 to cure this deficiency. 143 Secondly, the court stated that it 
is likely that Congress intended section 106 to be used as an 
alternative to the Superfund mechanism in view of the fact that 
the amount of money Congress allocated to the Superfund was 
much too small to address the dangers at all of the sites Congress 
considered to be in need of attention. 144 
In United States v. Outboard Marine Co. (OMC),145 the govern-
ment brought suit under section 106 for injunctive relief against a 
generator who at the time of the suit owned a disposal facility 
that was discharging a hazardous substance into navigable wa-
ters.l46 The court described the requested relief as a "cleanup 
injunction" -a court order forcing the defendant to undertake 
cleanup efforts. 147 The court refused to grant the defendant's 
motion to dismiss the section 106 claim, stating that OMC was 
clearly a proper defendant under seation 107 of CERCLA and that 
Congress must have intended the same parties to be liable for 
injunctive relief under section 106. 14S The court utilized section 107 
on the understanding that section 106 merely authorized suits 
and that substantive content in such suits must derive from 
another source, section 107 of CERCLA. 149 
In United States v. A & F Materials Company, Inc.,15o the gov-
ernment sued a past generator in part under section 106 in order 
to obtain an injunction to force the defendant to clean up a site at 
which its waste had been disposed but which it did not own. 1,",1 The 
court refused to dismiss the government's claim under section 
106, holding that the vague language of section 106 indicated that 
liability under section 106 is dependent on section 107.15~ Because 
I" [d. at 1110-12. 
143 [d. at 1111. 
144 [d. at 1112. 
145 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
J4fi The court found that the facility was discharging polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) 
into navigable waters. OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 54. PCB's are a carcinogenic insulating fluid 
whose manufacture is now banned. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980). 
147 OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 56. 
14i< [d. at 57. 
149 [d. at 56-57. 
150 United States v. A & F Materials Co. Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
I" A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1252. 
102 Id. at 1257. 
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past generators were explicitly liable parties under section 107 
the court concluded that they were also liable under section 106.153 
In United States v. New England PharmaceuticaP54 (NEP) the 
government sued a past generator under section 106 in an at-
tempt to obtain an order forcing the defendant to perform cleanup 
of a site that the defendant did not own. 15.~ In refusing to dismiss 
the government's claim under 106, the court held that section 106 
is applicable to past generators whose waste was disposed of at 
sites owned by other persons. l56 First, the court stated that the 
broad language of section 106 indicates that all parties liable for 
costs under section 107 are liable for equitable relief under section 
106.157 The court reasoned that in order for CERCLA to function 
effectively, section 106 and 107 must be allowed to work in tan-
dem, and that the differences in the types of relief authorized by 
the two sections refutes the argument that this use of section 106 
represents merely the duplication of the Superfund mechanism. 158 
The court did state, however, that section 106 was intended to be 
used when the Superfund process proved to be too cumbersome in 
the face of an imminent and·· substantial endangerment. 159 
United States v. Wade 160 stands, at least in part, in opposition to 
the above cases. In Wade, the government brought suit against a 
generator that had contracted to have its waste stored at a site 
that it did not own. 161 The government sought relief under section 
106, requesting the court to order the defendant to pay the costs 
of designing and implementing a plan to clean up the contami-
nated site. 161 The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss 
the section 106 claim on two grounds. First, the court stated that 
the type of relief requested by the government was inappropriate 
under the statute because it was an attempt to disguise a request 
for money damages as injunctive relief. l63 Secondly, the court 
153 Id. 
154 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical (NEP), 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 
1984). 
155 I d. at 826. 
156 I d. at 839. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 840 n. 17. 
159 Id. 
160 United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (D. Penn. 1982). 
161 Id. at 787. 
,.2 I d. at 792. 
163 Id. The Wade court based this assertion on the decision of the Federal District Court 
of New Jersey in U.S. v. Price (Price I), 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D. N.J. 1981)(interpretingJaffe 
v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979». Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 792. The Third Circuit, 
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stated that section 106 was not applicable to past generators who 
never owned the site in question (off-site generators).164 The court 
reasoned that past, off-site generators are expressly liable in 
actions brought pursuant to the response cost recovery provisions 
in section 107 of CERCLA 165 but that section 106 does not evidence 
an intent to confer liability on past generators. loo The court fur-
ther stated that section 106 applies only to future actions because 
the court was of the opinion that section 106 was written in the 
present tense, authorizing relief because of an " 'actual or threat~ 
ened release of a hazardous substance from a facility .... ' "167 In 
sum, Wade held that because section 106 did not apply to past 
actions, hazardous waste generators could not be held liable for 
past acts that relate to current pollution. lffi Thus, Wade stands not 
for the inapplicability of section 106 to generators as such, but 
rather, for the inapplicability of that section to past actions. 169 
The foregoing section demonstrates that the caselaw supports 
the application of section 106 to generators with regard to current 
dangers resulting from past disposal of their hazardous waste. 
However, Wade held that section 106 does not allow the judiciary 
to issue injunctions forcing the cleanup of sites that are present-
ing a current danger due to past disposal,l7o Aside from Wade, 
courts have unanimously held that section 106 may be used to 
force such cleanup by generators, but they differ in their reason-
ing. In OMC, A & F Materials, and NEP, the courts stated that 
section 106 is dependent on section 107 with regard to determin-
ing proper defendants. 171 In Reilly and Price, however, the courts 
however, reversed Price I after the Wade opinion was issued, stating that the lower court 
had read Jaffe incorrectly, and that the payment of money to fund a study to implement 
a site cleanup program was not an inappropriate form of equitable relief because it was 
preventive in nature, not compensatory. United States v. Price (Price II), 688 F.2d 204, 
212 (3d Cir. 1982). Because the Wade court is bound by the Third Circuit Court's opinion 
in Price, this part of its holding will probably not stand on appeal. 
164 Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 787. 
16.' 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (Supp. V 1981). 
166 Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 794. 
167 [d. 
168 [d. 
169 The Wade reasoning is somewhat unclear. The court appears to blur the distinction 
between the applicability of section 106 to past actions and its applicability to generators 
into one issue. The court in United States v. Outboard Marine Co., however, read the 
opinion as holding that section was inapplicable to the past generator defendant because 
that section does not apply to past actions, and this is what the language of Wade 
indicates. OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 58 n. 3. See Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 794. 
170 Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 794. 
171 OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 57;A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257;NEP, 579 F. Supp. at 
839. 
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seem to draw substance from section 106 itself in determining 
that past generators are liable under section 106.172 Finally, all of 
these cases-except Wade-agreed that section 106 applies to 
current dangers caused by past actions. l73 This article, by review-
ing the language of section 106 and the relevant caselaw, will 
discuss the applicability of section 106 to both current and past 
generators. The article concludes that section 106 applies to both 
generators and to past actions and thus to "past generators." 
2. Applicability of Section 106 to Generators: An Analysis of the 
Relevant Caselaw and Statutory Provisions. 
In United States v. Wade, the court held that section 106 did not 
impose liability on the defendant generator while each of the 
other cases construing that section have held to the contrary. 
However, the latter cases differed among themselves in their 
conclusion as to the proper source of substantive standards to be 
applied in actions brought under section 106. Some of this confu-
sion is based on disagreement over whether section 106 is sub-
stantive or merely jurisdictional. A jurisdictional statute empow-
ers a party to bring suit and confers jurisdiction upon the courts 
to hear that action. 174 If such a statute is merely jurisdictional, it 
does not create liability in any party.l75 Rather, it is dependent on 
another source for substantive standardsl76 such as the common 
law or remaining statutory provisions. l77 A substantive statute, 
on the other hand, creates and defines liability in actions brought 
thereunder.l78 The language of the statute is therefore the only 
proper source of substance in actions brought thereunder. 179 
In the analysis below, this article will discuss whether section 
106 is substantive or merely jurisdictional. After concluding that 
172 Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1113; Price III, 577 F. Supp. at 1111-12. Note, however, that 
while the Price court appears to treat section 106 as substantive in determining whether 
the defendant was a proper party, the court never explicitly states that this is what it is 
doing. Moreover, in discussing the proper standard of liability under section 106, the 
Price court explicitly rejects the Reilly analysis of section 106 as substantive. Price III, 
577 F. Supp. at 1113. Thus, Price is somewhat unclear on this issue of whether section 106 
is jurisdictional or substantive. 
173 See, e.g., Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1113. See supra text and notes at notes 130-67. 
174 OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 55. See also United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery 
Service Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 144 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (construing section 7003 of RCRA). 
175 OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 55. 
176 Id. See also A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257; NEP, 579 F. Supp. at 839. 
177 OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 55. 
178 Id. 
179 See OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 55. See also NEP, 579 F. Supp. at 839. 
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section 106 should be read as merely jurisdictional and dependent 
on section 107 for its substance, the article will discuss the 
applicability of section 106 to generators of hazardous waste in 
that context. 
a. Section 106: A Jurisdictional or Substantive Statute? 
Most cases construing section 106 of CERCLA have not 
squarely addressed the issue of whether the section is jurisdic-
tional or substantive. Those decisions which have treated section 
106 as substantive seem merely to assume that the section should 
be read as such without exploring the issue. 18o The three cases 
that have construed section 106 as jurisdictional only have merely 
stated that the broad language of section 106 is too vague to 
create liability in any party, and have therefore concluded that 
the proper defendants are those defined in section 107 of 
CERCLA.181 
The decision which most squarely addresses this issue is United 
States v. Outboard Marine Co. (OMC), which concluded that sec-
tion 106 was merely jurisdictional.l8~ The OMC court noted that 
the plain language of section 106 does not create liability in any 
party; rather, it merely authorizes lawsuits and equitable relief.183 
The court expressly rejected the Reilly court's reliance on the 
180 See, e.g., Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1113. 
'"' See, e.g., OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 57. Although these decisions construing section 106 
have split on this issue, all but Wade have found that generators are liable for their past 
actions under that section. See, e.g., NEP, 579 F. Supp. at 839. However, the issue retains 
its importance because if section 106 is substantive, there is a stronger case supporting 
the conclusion reached in Wade. First, if section 106 is substantive, it does not depend on 
section 107 for specification of proper parties. Therefore, it is possible to argue that there 
should be a distinction made between "off-site" and "on-site" generators (those who do 
not own or do own the site in question, respectively). This would not be possible under 
section 107 which makes no such distinction; it holds any generator liable, regardless of 
its ownership of the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1981). This argument is made 
stronger by the phrase in section 106 which directs the court to grant "such relief as the 
public interest and the equities of the case shall require." 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 
1981). It may be argued that to hold a generator liable for waste disposal over which it 
had no control (as may be the case with respect to an off-site generator) would be 
inequitable or against the public interest. Thus, although even those courts which have 
treated section 106 as substantive have held that generators are liable, see, e.g., Reilly, 
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113, this conclusion is not as clearly mandated under the language of 
section 106 itself as under section 107. Therefore, while the issue of whether section 106 is 
substantive or jurisdictional has not proved to be dispositive thus far, it could prove to be 
of great importance. 
I"' OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 55. 
1!!3 ld. 
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phrase "the public interest and the equities of the case" as giving 
sufficient guidance to draw substance from section 106.184 Finally, 
the court concluded that section 107 of CERCLA was the main 
liability creating provision, and that those liable under section 107 
are liable in actions brought pursuant to section 106.185 Other 
cases have followed this line of reasoning, holding that section 106 
is dependent on the substantive provisions in section 107.1~ 
This interpretation of section 106 as merely jurisdictional seems 
to be correct for a number of reasons. First, the cases that have 
read that section as substantive have offered no arguments as to 
why it should be construed as such. Instead, they have merely 
assumed that section 106 is substantive and proceeded to decide 
whether or not the section applies to past generators.l87 Secondly, 
it is difficult to conclude that Congress intended section 106 to 
confer substantive liability when that section was drafted so vag-
uely in comparison to section 107. The latter section states in 
great detail who should be liable under the Act, 1~ while the 
former merely authorizes the relief necessary to abate a threat 
due to the release of a hazardous substance without any mention 
of who the defendant may be in actions for such relief. 189 If Con-
gress had intended section 106 to confer substantive liability, it is 
likely that they would have used some language which would at 
least suggest which parties are proper defendants. For example, 
Congress could have drafted section 106 to be similar to section 
7003 of RCRA, which authorizes the immediate restraint of any-
one "contributing to" the creation of a hazardous condition. 190 
This phrase, while not as clear as section 107 of CERCLA, at least 
focuses to some extent on the party to be sued rather than the 
threat to be abated. WI Finally, it seems likely that apart from 
language to the contrary, the same party liable for damages 
184 [d. 
Ill.' [d. at 56-57. 
"'" A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257; NEP, 579 F. Supp. at 839. 
187 See, e.g., Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1111-14; see also Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 789. 
II .. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. V 1981). 
1"9 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. V 1981). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 7003 (Supp. v 1981). 
191 This is not to suggest that section 7003 is necessarily substantive. However, the 
language does seem to provide better grounds for such a conclusion than the language of 
section 106 of CERCLA. For a decision holding that section 7003 is substantive, see 
Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1107. But see United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery Service 
Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 143 (N.D. Ind. 1980). 
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under section 107 should also be liable for equitable relief under 
section 106. 19~ 
In sum, there is ample basis to conclude that section 106, which 
provides almost no guidance as to who is liable thereunder, is 
jurisdictional only.193 If section 106 is jurisdictional only the in-
quiry must turn to the proper source of substantive standards. 
The following subsection will address this issue, and concludes 
that the proper source for substantive standards under section 
106 is section 107 of CERCLA. 
b. The Source of Substanative Standards under Section 106: 
Federal Common Law or Section 107 of CERCLA? 
In United States v. Outboard Marine Co. (OMC) the court recog-
nized that substantive standards under section 106 could be 
found in the federal common law of nuisance or section 107 of 
CERCLA. 194 The court concluded that section 107 was the proper 
source, basing its analysis on the Supreme Court's decision in City 
of Milwaukee v. Illinois l95 (Milwaukee II), which eliminated the 
use of the federal common law in the area of hazardous waste 
disposal. The following subsections will discuss whether the OMC 
court reached the proper conclusion. The article concludes that 
the federal common law is no longer applicable under section 106 
and that section 107 is therefore the proper source of substantive 
standards. 
(iJ Federal Common Law of Nuisance 
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1)196 the Supreme 
Court held that the state could maintain an action for abatement 
of water pollution under the federal common law of nuisance. 197 
The court reasoned that the pollution of navigable waters in-
volved a uniquely federal interest which required a uniform fed-
'"" OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 57. 
,"3 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Supp. V 1981). See OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 55. See also A & F 
Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257. 
194 OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 56. 
19.' City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 11), 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
196 406 U.S. 91, 92 (1972). 
197 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107. See generally, Note, Federal Common Law Remedies 
for the Abatement of Water Pollution, 5 Fordham U rh. L.J. 549 (1977). See also Collins, The 
Dilemma of the Downstream State: The Untimely Demise of Federal Common Law 
Nuisance, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 295 (1984). 
198 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 104. 
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eral rule. l98 The court further held that until some future time 
when federal statutes occupied the realm of water pollution, the 
federal common law claim could be utilized.!99 This rule was sub-
sequently expanded to permit federal courts to decide groundwa-
ter pollution cases under the federal common law of nuisance as 
well.~'OO After these cases were decided, however, the Supreme 
Court held, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee IIfO! that 
the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(FWPCA) had occupied the field of water pollution and had 
preempted the federal common law of nuisance with respect to 
water pollution.:!o2 The court stated that the preemption question 
is unlike the constitutional issue of the preemption of state law in 
that the federal common law is an unusual development that may 
be used only in the absence of an act of Congress. 203 As such, 
federal common law is easily displaced by federal statutes.:!04 
The district courts, following the broad pronouncements of Mil-
waukee II, have consistently held that CERCLA and RCRA pre-
empt the use of the federal common law of nuisance with respect 
to water and groundwater pollution.205 For example, the OMC 
court, relying on Milwaukee II, held that the federal common law 
was not the proper source of substantive standards in actions 
brought pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA.:!06 Similarly, in City 
of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical CompanY,207 the court stated 
that RCRA and CERCLA had "unquestionably" occupied the 
field of hazardous waste disposal. ~'O!l Thus, in construing section 
107 of CERCLA, the court stated that the use of federal common 
law is no longer permissible in cases of groundwater pollution 
resulting from hazardous waste disposal. 209 Other federal courts 
have uniformly adopted this conclusion.210 
199 Id. 
''00 United States v. Solvents Recovery Service Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (D. Conn. 
1980). 
201 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
,"" Id. at 317-19. 
203 Id. at 314. 
204 The court noted that much less deference is to be accorded to federal common law 
than state law in pre-emption questions. Id. at 312-17. 
"" See e.g., OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 56. 
206 OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 56. 
,>07 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Penn. 1982). 
208 Id. at 1148. 
''09 Id. at 1147. 
210 PriceI, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D. N.J. 1981); United States V. Waste Industries, 556 
F. Supp. 1301, 1316 n. 29 (E.D. N.C. 1982). 
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It is therefore clear that the federal common law of nuisance no 
longer applies in the field of hazardous waste disposal. 211 As a 
result, the substantive standards governing an action brought 
pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA must derive from the remain-
ing provisions of CERCLA. 212 
(ii) Responsible Parties Under Section 107 of CERCLA 
If section 106 is merely a jurisdictional statute and the use of 
the federal common law is no longer possible in hazardous waste 
cases, then the only remaining source of substantive standards is 
the balance of CERCLA. 213 The class of responsible persons must 
therefore be determined by section 107, which is the only section 
of CERCLA that defines potential defendants under the act.214 
Courts that have held that section 106 does not define proper 
defendants have uniformly looked to section 107 for such substan-
tive content.215 
The language of section 107 clearly specifies any generator as a 
proper defendant. 216 Under section 107(a)(2) any person who at the 
time of disposal owned or operated a facility at which hazardous 
substances were disposed of is expressly stated to be a proper 
defendant. 217 Thus, a generator such as the defendant in Reilly, 
who disposed of its waste at its own site (on-site generator) would 
be a proper defendant under section 107 regardless of whether it 
still owns the site at the time of the imminent and substantial 
endangerment.218 Secondly,. section 107(aX3) clearly specifies as a 
proper defendant any party who arranged for the transport 
and/or disposal of hazardous waste at a site owned by someone 
else (off-site generator).219 Thus, a generator such as the defen-
dant in Price who arranged to have waste disposed of at a facility 
is also a proper defendant under section 107.2'20 
Therefore, because substantive standards under section 106 
211 For an excellent criticism of Milwaukee II, see Collins supra note 197. 
2.2 See OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 56. 
2.3Id. 
2.4 Id. See also A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1259. 
2'5 OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 56-57; A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257;NEP, 579 F. Supp. 
at 839. See also Price III, 577 F. Supp. at 1113. 
2.6 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. V 1981); see OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 57. See also A & F 
Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257. 
217 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (Supp. V 1980). 
2'·Id. 
219 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (Supp. v 1980). 
220 Id. 
406 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:381 
must derive from section 107 of CERCLA,:m and because all 
generators are clearly specified as proper defendants in section 
107/22 generators may be responsible parties in actions brought 
under section 106. However, in order for section 106 to be applica-
ble to past generators, it must be applicable not only to 
generators, but also to past actions. The following subsection will 
discuss this issue and will conclude that section 106 does apply to 
past actions; that is, that the section may be used to force cleanup 
at facilities that are currently dangerous due to past disposal of 
hazardous waste and the subsequent release or threatened re-
lease of such waste. 
3. Applicability of Section 106 to Past Actions: An Analysis of the 
Language of Section 106 and the Relevant Caselaw 
In order for a past generator to be a proper defendant under 
section 106, that section must be construed to be applicable to past 
actions. Most courts that have addressed this issue have phrased 
their discussion in terms of whether section 106 applies to "inac-
tive" sites.223 An inactive site is one at which waste was disposed of 
in the past but which is not operating as a facility at the time an 
action is brought. 224 Thus the class of "inactive sites" is merely a 
subset of the class of past disposal sites, and this article will 
address the more general category of past actions without regard 
to whether the site is currently in operation. 225 
The question of the applicability of section 106 to past actions 
should be governed entirely by section 106,226 without reference to 
section 107. Section 106 explicitly requires that certain conditions 
must exist at a "facility" before the section may be invoked, and 
section 101 defines a "facility" as a site where both past and 
present disposal actions have occurred.227 Thus, section 106 pro-
221 See OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 56-57. See also A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257. 
222 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2), (3) (Supp. V 1980). 
223 See e.g., Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1113. 
224 See S. REP. NO. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980). 
225 There is no relevant difference for the purposes of the discussion here between past 
actions at inactive sites and past actions at sites currently in operation. The crucial 
question is whether section 106 reaches past actions. This is because all inactive sites are 
past disposal sites, but not all past sites are inactive. This article addresses the more 
general class of past disposal sites. 
2'lfi See Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1113. 
227 42 U.S.C. § 9601(4) (Supp. V 1981). 
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vides a clear answer to the question of whether that section 
applies to past actions. ~~8 
In the balance of this subsection, this article will analyze the 
language of section 106 and the relevant caselaw in determining 
whether section 106 may be invoked where past disposal has led 
to a current danger at a facility. The article concludes that section 
106 clearly applies to such past actions. Because section 106 also 
applies to generators,~:!9 it is applicable to past generators. 
In United States v. Wade, the sole decision to hold that section 
106 applies only to present and future actions, the court correctly 
noted that the language of that section provides for relief in the 
event of an "actual or threatened release from a facility.":!30 The 
court reasoned that this statutory phrase precludes the applica-
tion of that section to past actions because the phrase is written in 
the present tense. ~31 The court's reasoning, however, is not con-
vincing. While this phrase is arguably written in the present 
tense, CERCLA defines the term "facility" in a way that clearly 
brings past actions within the ambit of section 106. A facility is 
defined as "any site or area where a hazardous substance has 
been disposed of, or placed or otherwise come to be located."~3~ 
(emphasis added). Thus, while the actual or threatened release 
must occur presently, the site from which the substance is re-
leased is defined to include sites where hazardous waste has been 
deposited in the past. ~33 Furthermore, the statute defines a "re-
lease" to include such processes as "leaking," "escaping," and 
"leaching,"234 none of which require any current conduct by a 
hazardous waste generator. This definition therefore includes 
under section 106 any discharges from inactive~35 sites, or more 
""" Even if section 106 does not determine on its own whether past actions may be 
addressed under that section, the considerations discussed above indicate that section 
107 of CERCLA would provide the resolution of this issue. See supra text and notes at 
notes 194-215. As the liability provision for Superfund, section 107 is written completely 
in the past tense, and clearly applies to past actions. Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 794. Indeed, 
the principal purpose of Superfund was to address problems of inactive and orphan sites. 
See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1980). Thus, if section 107 is to determine 
whether or not past actions may be addressed in actions under section 106, the issue 
would hardly arise; it is clear that section 107 applies to such actions. 
""" See supra text and notes at notes 173-224. 
"'" 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1980). 
"31 Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 794. 
"3" 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (Supp. V 1981). 
"33 [d. 
"34 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (Supp. V 1981). 
""" See supra note 225. 
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generally, the release of a hazardous substance236 anytime after it 
has been placed in a disposal site. 237 
Comparison to the analogous section 7003 of RCRA further 
suggests the applicability of section 106 to past actions.:l38 Section 
7003 authorizes the President to "immediately restrain" any per-
son "contributing to ... [the] handling, storage, treatment, trans-
portation or disposal ... " of hazardous wastes.239 (emphasis add-
ed). This language restrains a party who is "contributing" to the 
creation of a hazard by its present actions.24O In sharp contrast, 
the language of section 106 of CERCLA states that the govern-
ment may secure "such relief as may be necessary to abate ... " 
the hazard. 241 This language concentrates on the abatement of 
present dangers,242 however and whenever caused, rather than 
the current restraint of particular parties. Thus, it indicates that 
a party may be liable for an ongoing hazard under section 106, 
although the disposal activities have ceased. 243 
The application of general principles of statutory interpretation 
also supports the conclusion that section 106 applies to past ac-
tions. In construing section 7003 of RCRA, the district court in 
United States v. Waste Industries 244 adopted the rules stated by 
the Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Public National Bank of 
New York. 245 There, the court recognized that a statute is ani-
mated by a general purpose, and that each section should be 
construed so as to produce a harmonious whole with regard to 
that purpose.246 Applying this rule to section 7003 of RCRA, the 
Waste Industries court noted that RCRA was a regulatory statute 
whose purpose was to impose standards upon ongoing conduct 
connected with the handling and disposal of hazardous waste. 
Congress had no intention of imposing liability for past disposal 
practices.247 The court therefore concluded that section 7003 
236 See supra text and notes at notes 99-108. 
237 These terms do not exclusively describe events occurring as a result of past dis-
posal, but they clearly include such events within their scope. 
238 See Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1111; Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1111. 
239 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. v 1981). 
240 Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. at 1307. But see Price II, 688 F.2d at 214 (stating that 
section 7003 could, in some circumstances, apply to past actions). 
241 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
242 See Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1113. 
243 Price Ill, 577 F. Supp. at 1112. 
244 United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1982). 
245 278 U.S. 101, 104 (1928). 
246 Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. at 1309. 
247 I d. at 1310. 
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should similarly be limited to regulating ongoing actions,248 since 
any other result would be inconsistent with the generally pro-
spective and regulatory purpose of RCRA.249 
Application of this principle to CERCLA suggests that section 
106 should be read to provide relief from current dangers caused 
by past actions. Unlike RCRA, the underlying purpose of 
CERCLA was not to provide a prospective regulatory scheme for 
the hazardous waste industry.25o Rather, the thrust of the statute 
is to facilitate the abatement of current hazards caused by past 
disposal at hazardous waste sites.251 In order to produce a result 
consistent with the general purpose of CERCLA, section 106 
should be construed to apply to current dangers resulting from 
past disposal activities. 252 
In short, three factors militate in favor of interpreting section 
106 as applying to past actions. First, the definitions of "facility" 
and "release" in CERCLA indicate that leakage of hazardous 
wastes from sites where waste has been disposed in the past is 
one of the dangerous conditions that section 106 was designed to 
address. 253 Indeed, the main purpose of CERCLA was to address 
current dangers that exist due to past disposal practices.254 Sec-
ondly, unlike the analogous section 7003 of RCRA, which au-
thorizes the "immediate restraint" of anyone "contributing to" 
the creation of a hazard,255 section 106 of CERCLA contains no 
language which could limit the operation of the section to current 
acts contributing to the creation of a dangerous condition.256 Fi-
nally, because CERCLA in general was enacted as a retrospective 
cleanup statute/57 consistency with that general purpose de-
mands that section 106 be interpreted to be applicable to past 
actions as well.256 
""" Id. at 1310-11. 
"49 Id. 
"50 See Price Ill, 577 F. Supp. at 1112. 
"51 The language of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. v 1981) supports this conclusion. See 
also Price Ill, 577 F. Supp. at 1112; Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. at 1316-17; S. REP. No. 
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1980). 
"5" Price Ill, 577 F. Supp. at 1112. 
"53 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9), (22) (Supp. v 1981). 
"54 See supra note 251. 
"5., 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. V 1981). 
"56 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
"57 See supra note 251. 
"51! See supra note 246. 
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4. Conclusion: Whether Section 106 Applies to Past Generators of 
Hazardous Waste 
Section 106 of CERCLA should be applicable to generators of 
hazardous waste with regard to their past actions. First, section 
106, through the operation of the explicit language of section 107, 
applies to all generators of hazardous waste. Secondly, section 106 
applies to past actions for three reasons. First, the definitions of 
"facility" and "release" in CERCLA clearly incorporate past dis-
posal actions under the operation of section 106. Secondly, com-
parison to section 7003 of RCRA illustrates that the operation of 
section 106 was not intended to be limited to ongoing disposal 
practices. Third, because CERCLA is generally a retrospective 
cleanup statute, a harmonious reading of the statute requires 
that section 106 be interpreted to be applicable to past actions as 
well. 
Therefore, because section 106 clearly applies to generators and 
past actions, the provision may be invoked to secure equitable 
relief against past generators. One issue that remains, however, 
concerns the choice of the proper standard ofliability to be applied 
to past generator defendants in actions brought pursuant to sec-
tion 106. The following section of this article will discuss this issue, 
and concludes that a standard of strict liability, indicated in sec-
tion 107 of CERCLA, is the proper standard to be applied under 
section 106. 
V. THE STANDARD OF LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 106 
Section 106 of CERCLA does not specify any standard of liabil-
ity. ~39 Most courts, therefore, have recognized that section 106 was 
not intended to impose liability, but that such a substantive stan-
dard must derive from another provision within the statute.~fl{) 
Great confusion exists however over what that standard should 
be. In cases brought pursuant to section 106, the government has 
consistently argued that a standard of strict liability~61 applies, 
"'" 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
"'" Price III, 577 F. Supp. at 1113. Cf OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 57. 
""I Generally, under a strict liability standard, the plaintiff need only prove that the 
defendant committed the act in question and that such act caused the harm complained 
of. The thrust of the standard is that lack of due care need not be shown by the plaintiff, 
and that such due care does not constitute a defense to liability. See generally, W. 
KEETON, D. DOBBS, & D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, 534-38 (1984) 
(hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON). 
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while defendant generators have asserted that a negligence 
standard~6~ is appropriate.~63 In the following subsections, this 
article will discuss (1) the proper source of a standard ofliability in 
actions brought under section 106, and (2) whether that standard 
is one of strict liability or one of negligence. The article concludes 
that the proper standard of liability in actions brought under 
section 106 is one of strict liability, to be drawn from section 107 of 
CERCLA. 
A. The Source of a Standard of Liability in Actions Brought 
Under Section 106 
Section 106 does not define any substantive standard of liability 
to be applied in actions brought thereunder. ~64 As concluded 
above, the section is merely jurisdictional, and substantive stan-
dards must be drawn from some other source such as the federal 
common law of nuisance or other provisions within CERCLA.~6.'; 
After the decisions of Milwaukee I I and its progeny, it would seem 
that federal common law is no longer available in actions brought 
under section 106. ~66 
In United States v. Price, for example, the court held that 
Milwaukee II had preempted the federal common law of nuisance 
and that section 107 was clearly the proper source of a standard of 
liability in actions brought under section 106.2b'7 The court rea-
soned that the language of section 106 does not define any stan-
dard of liability to be applied to defendants under section 106 
while section 107, entitled "liability" clearly "sets forth standards 
of liability and associated defenses."~68 Other courts have reached 
this conclusion based on similar considerations. ~69 
Therefore, it is clear that a substantive standard of liability in 
actions brought under section 106 must derive from section 107 of 
'"' If a standard of negligence is proper under section 106, the government will have to 
establish a duty of due care in the defendant and that the failure to meet such duty 
proximately caused the injury at a waste disposal site. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
261, at 143-45. This is of course a substantially more difficult burden for the plaintiffthan 
that which obtains under a strict liability standard. See supra note 261. 
'63 See e.g., Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1113. 
'64 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
,~, OMC, 556 F. Supp. at 56-57. See Price III, 577 F. Supp. at 1113. See supra text and 
notes at notes 194-212. 
'"" See supra text and notes at notes 196-212. 
'"7 Price III, 577 F. Supp. at 1113. 
'"" Id. 
'"9 A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1257; NEP, 579 F. Supp. at 844. 
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CERCLA. The following subsection will discuss whether the 
standard which derives from section 107 is one of strict liability or 
of negligence. 
B. A Proper Standard of Liability Under Section 107 
Section 107 does not explicitly define a standard of liability. It 
merely states that certain parties shall be "liable" for certain 
costs of hazard abatement at facilities and certain damage to 
natural resources. ~70 The term "liable" is then defined in section 
101(32) of CERCLA as the standard of liability provided under 
section 311 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).~71 Caselaw construing 
section 311 and section 107, as well as the legislative history of 
CERCLA, clearly establish that defendants in actions brought 
under these sections, and thus under section 106, should be held 
to a standard of strict liability. ~n 
Cases construing section 311 of CWA have uniformly held that 
strict liability is the appropriate standard under that section. ~73 In 
each of those cases, an oil tanker had discharged oil into navigable 
waters as a result of various mishaps such as a collision with a 
tugboat,274 and the accidental opening of an oil valve by an em-
"0 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. v 1980). 
271 Clean Water Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1977). Section 107 of CERCLA states that 
parties shall be liable "subject only" to the specific defenses listed therein, and due care 
is not among them. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (Supp. v 1981). This suggests that section 107 itself 
would impose strict liability, and one court has so held. Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1118. 
Because the statute specifies that the standard of liability for section 107 actions should 
be the standard provided in section 311 of CWA, the latter provision is the proper focus of 
the inquiry. 
272 See e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan, 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n. 4 (E.D. Penn. 1982). 
273 On several occasions, federal courts have held that polluters sued under section 311 
of the Clean Water Act are strictly liable for cleanup. See, e.g., United States v. LeBouf 
Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1980), Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied 
Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979), United States v. MN Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 
(5th Cir. 1982), Sabine Towing & Transportation Co. Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d 561 
(Ct. Cl. 1981). Each of these cases involve the spillage of oil into navigable waters as a 
result of various mishaps. In each case, the court states that section 311 actions are 
governed by a standard of strict liability. None of these cases, however, provide any 
reasons for the adoption of this standard. See, e.g., LeBouJ, 621 F.2d at 789; Sabine, 666 
F.2d at 563; Steuart, 596 F.2d at 613; MIV Big Sam, 681 F.2d at 437. Nonetheless, these 
decisions are consistent with the text of section 311, which states that liability is imposed 
"subject to the defenses" specified therein. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. v 1981). Because due 
care is not among the defenses specified, it seems clear that strict liability is the proper 
standard. See Price III, 577 F. Supp. at 1114 (interpreting similarlanguage in section 107 
of CERCLA). 
274 MVIBig Sam, 681 F.2d at 437. 
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ployee of the tanker.~75 In reviewing the district court decisions, 
the circuit courts uniformly held that section 311 of CW A imposes 
a strict liability standard on those who are proper defendants 
under that section, noting that such liability was subject only to 
the defenses enumerated in the statute. ~76 
Cases construing section 107 have also uniformly concluded 
that strict liability is the proper standard under that section. For 
example, in City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Company,m 
the city brought an action, in part under CERCLA, to recover 
costs incurred as a result of the defendant's dumping of industrial 
waste in a city landfill. ~78 In denying the defendant's motion to 
dismiss the city's CERCLA claim on other grounds/79 the court 
stated in dictum that the cases construing section 3110f CWA and 
the legislative history of CERCLA clearly indicate that the ap-
propriate standard under section 107 is one of strict liability. ~~o 
The result reached in United States v. Price strengthens the 
conclusion that strict liability is the proper standard of liability. 
There, the government sued under section 106 of CERCLA to 
force a past generator to undertake cleanup at a facility.~81 The 
court held that section 107 was the proper source of a substantive 
standard and that the standard was one of strict liability. ~~~ The 
court reasoned that the provision of a defense in section 107(b)(3) 
that includes a requirement of due care would be meaningless 
unless section 107 imposed strict liability.~83 The court further 
found that a strict liability standard would best serve the Con-
gressional purpose in enacting CERCLA: to facilitate cleanup and 
deflect the costs from the taxpayers by imposing it on, among 
others, past generators. ~84 In addition to Price, other federal 
courts have reached the conclusion that section 107 imposes strict 
'70 LeBouJ, 621 F.2d at 788. 
"" See MV/Big Sam, 681 F.2d at 437. 
m 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Penn. 1982). 
"H Id. at 1135. Under CERCLA, responsible parties are liable to cities, states, or the 
federal government for incurring response costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
"" The defendants' argument was that the city should not be allowed to sue because as 
the site owner, the city was also a responsible party under CERCLA. The court held that 
this did not prevent the city from maintaining the action. Stepan, 544 F. Supp. at 1141. 
"" Stepan, 544 F. Supp. at 1135. 
'HI Price Ill, 577 F. Supp. at 1108. 
'H' Id. at 1113-14. 
"3 Id. at 1114. 
'H4 Id. 
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liability on those whose actions are to be judged under that 
section. ~&') 
The legislative history of CERCLA reinforces the conclusion 
that the proper standard under section 107 is one of strict liabil-
ity. ~86 In its original version, section 107 specifically stated that 
defendants in actions brought thereunder would be strictly liable. 
This language was subsequently deleted and replaced by the 
reference to the standard specified in section 311 of CWA.287 De-
spite this alteration, the legislative record suggests a Con-
gressional intent to impose strict liability. Senator Randolph, 
Chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
stated that the compromise version finally enacted retained a 
standard of strict liability by the reference to section 311.288 Con-
gressman Florio, who introduced the original bill, stated that the 
compromise version of section 107 was still intended to impose a 
standard of strict liability.~89 Moreover, federal courts hearing 
actions under CERCLA have stated that the legislative history 
clearly supports the conclusion that the proper standard under 
section 107 is one of strict liability.~90 
Thus, both the legislative history of CERCLA and the caselaw 
construing section 107 and section 311 of CW A uniformly recog-
nize that the standard of liability under section 107 is one of strict 
liability. In some cases, the application of a strict liability stan-
dard could be crucial to the fulfillment of Congress' intent in 
enacting CERCLA, which was to address the problem of unsafe 
past disposal sites. ~91 A negligence standard could present many 
obstacles to reaching that goal. For example, it could be difficult 
to establish a lack of due care on the part of a generator, who at 
the time of the enforcement may be the only solvent responsible 
party. Both the passage of time and inadequate record keeping, 
especially prior to the enactment of RCRA, would make a finding 
of liability particularly difficult. The imposition of strict liability, 
therefore, facilitates the attainment of the Congressional goal of 
285 See e.g., Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1118; Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 793 n. 20. 
286 See generally, Grad, A Legislative History 0/ the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act 0/1980,8 COL. J. OF ENVTL. L.l 
(1982). 
2H7 Stepan, 544 F. Supp. at 1140; Grad, supra note 287, at 19. 
2"" 126 CONGo REC. S14964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). 
1H9 126 CONGo REC. H11787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). 
190 Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 793 n. 20; Stepan, 544 F. Supp. at 1140 n. 4. 
291 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1980). 
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forcing those responsible for hazardous wastes to bear the costs 
involved in rendering disposal sites harmless to the public health 
and environment.:192 
One commentator has argued, however, that it is unfair to 
impose strict liability on a party who was not "intimately in-
volved" in the challenged pollution activity.293 According to this 
argument, all of the cases applying a strict liability standard 
under section 311 of CWA have involved defendants who have 
been directly involved in oil tanker spills.:194 It is further argued 
that while imposition of strict liability in such cases is justified, 
some situations under CERCLA warrant only a standard of neg-
ligence. One such example is where a defendant purchases a 
landfill years after dumping has ceased and is technically liable as 
a site owner under section 107(a)(1).:195 
While this approach could avoid some potentially inequitable 
results, it is inconsistent with the caselaw and the statute itself. 
Federal courts have uniformly acknowledged that actions under 
section 107 are governed by a standard of strict liability.296 There 
is no indication in any of these cases that defendants should be 
held to a different standard of liability depending on the extent of 
their involvement in the disposal activity.297 Moreover, it is illogi-
cal to limit section 107 liability by arguing that cases under sec-
tion 311 have involved only certain parties. Section 107 explicitly 
defines the parties that may be liable in actions brought under 
that section;298 section 311 merely furnishes the standard to be 
applied to any responsible party under section 107.299 Thus, this 
argument is clearly inconsistent with the statute itself and the 
caselaw construing section 107. 
Finally, although it seems clear that a defendant with only a 
292 I d. at 13. 
293 Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some 
Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 260, 276 (1981). The author wrote: 
[S]trict liability standard should be confined to those parties who engaged in 
substantial and purposeful hazardous waste disposal ... (and not those) whose 
conduct was substantially unrelated to the present danger ... or who did not 
obtain commercial benefit from their conduct. 
294 Id. at 275. 
29" This was the situation in Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1073 (D. N.J. 1981). 
296 Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 793 n. 21; Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1118; Stepan, 544 F. Supp. at 
1140 n. 4, Price III, 577 F. Supp. at 1113-14. 
''97 It should be understood that the argument was "noted," "in passing," without an 
opinion on its validity in Stepan, 544 F. Supp. at 1143 n. 10. 
296 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
299 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. V 1981). 
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minimal role in the activity in question should not be liable to the 
same extent as one who more fully contributed to the hazard, the 
solution to this inequity is not to alter the strict liability standard. 
The statute mandates such a standard, and it would be problem-
atic to decide what level of participation would be sufficient to 
warrant the strict liability standard. A more simple solution that 
is consistent with the statute and caselaw would be to apportion 
liability among parties according to their contribution to the 
hazardous condition. Indeed, the caselaw has begun to develop 
the concept of joint and several liability300 under CERCLA to 
accomplish the goal of equitable apportionment. Under these few 
cases, if the defendant can show that its contribution to the 
hazard was separable from the others and also demonstrate the 
extent of its contribution, it will be liable only for such contribu-
tion.301 It seems clear, therefore, that a defendant who purchases 
a landfill years after dumping had ceased would be technically 
strictly liable, but would share in the cost of cleanup only to the 
extent of its contribution to the hazard. 30~ 
In conclusion, the source of a substantive standard of liability to 
be applied in actions brought under section 106 is section 107 of 
CERCLA. This standard is defined in CERCLA as the standard 
provided under section 311 of CWA.303 The cases interpreting both 
section 311 and CERCLA, as well as the legislative history of 
CERCLA, support the conclusion that the proper standard is one 
of strict Ii ability. 304 Therefore, where the government invokes sec-
tion 106, the standard of liability that must be applied in such 
actions is one of strict liability. 
300 If a party is jointly and severally liable, he is individually liable for the entire harm; 
the plaintiff may recover from that defendant alone, but of course, may only recover 
once. Traditionally, a party was jointly and severally liable only when he acted in concert 
with others to commit an act. Recently, the trend has been to impose joint and several 
liability in cases where the defendants' acts unite to cause a single indivisible harm 
regardless whether they acted in concert or not. See generally, PROSSER & KEETON, 
supra note 261, at 313-24. 
301 United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 803, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
302 See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810. The issue of when a party is jointly and 
severally liable and when contributions may be separated has just begun to be litigated 
under CERCLA. For an excellent introduction to the issues, see Note, Joint and Several 
Liability Under Superfund, 13 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 484 (1981). The cases addressing this 
issue thus far are: United States v. Chern-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 803 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United 
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823 
(W.O. Mo. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Company Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. 
Ill. 1984). 
303 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. V 1981). 
304 See supra text and notes at notes 270-92. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When CERCLA was enacted, it seemed that the Superfund 
mechanism would be perfectly suited to solve the environmental 
problems presented by such hazardous waste disposal sites as 
Love Canal.305 However, as it became apparent that the Super-
fund was too small and often too cumbersome, the government 
turned to section 106 as an alternate method of cleaning up 
hazardous waste sites. While this reliance on section 106 has 
brought vigorous opposition from past generators of hazardous 
waste, the statute has been successfully enforced. From the 
caselaw generated by section 106, a number of conclusions can be 
reached. First, section 106 clearly applies to past actions. The 
definition of "facility" in CERCLA explicitly includes sites where 
waste has been deposited in the past. In addition, because the 
general purpose of CERCLA was to address the problem of past 
disposal, it seems likely that section 106 was intended to reach the 
effects of past and present disposal. 
Secondly, section 106 is merely a jurisdictional statute which 
specifies neither the parties liable under that section nor the 
standard of liability to be applied. Milwaukee II and its progeny 
suggest that the proper source of substantive standards is section 
107 of CERCLA. 
Analysis of section 107 and the caselaw construing that section 
indicates that generators of hazardous waste are proper defen-
dants in actions brought under section 106. Section 107 explicitly 
states that such parties are liable for various costs of cleanup and 
for damage to the environment. Finally, the standard of liability to 
be applied to such parties has been uniformly held to be one of 
strict liability. Moreover, the legislative history of CERCLA indi-
cates that Congress intended that such a standard be applied 
under section 107. 
The use of section 106 against past generators promises to be 
very effective. Only the Wade court has held that section 106 may 
not be used to force past generators to undertake cleanup at sites 
where their waste, disposed of in the past, is now contributing to 
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or envi-
ronment. If the government continues to prevail in the enforce-
ment of section 106 against both present and past generators, the 
Congressional purpose of CERCLA will be realized. Past hazard-
:." See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-10 (1980). 
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ous waste disposal sites will be more readily rendered harmless 
through cleanup, and those parties responsible will have further 
incentive to ensure that their waste is safely disposed of. These 
developments will help prevent the reoccurrence of countless 
tragedies throughout the nation. 
